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Robb [trans.] [New York: G. Schirmer, 1965], 18).
NOTES 153
11. Cooper quotes Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein s Meaning of Life , Times Higher
Education Supplement, 19 May 1989.
Chapter 3: Long lives, short lives
1. Some rather similar sentiments have been expressed by Jonathan Glover. Given
the company of the right people , he writes, I would be glad of the chance to
sample a few million years and see how it went (Causing Death and Saving
Lives [Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977], 57).
2. Steven Luper remarks that he finds Unamuno s adamancy refreshing (Invul-
nerability [Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1996], 104).
3. The question of why we have asymmetrical attitudes to the thought of our pre-
natal non-existence (which does not worry us) and to that of our posthumous
non-existence (which worries many people a great deal) is one that we shall
return to in Chapter 5.
4. If youth only knew, if old age were only capable . This saying, in its French
form, can be traced back to Henri Estienne s Les Premices, ou le livre des prover-
bes epigrammatisez, ou des epigrammes proverbialez (Geneva: H. Estienne,
1594), 173.
5. There is an echo of Shakespeare in Sigmund Freud: The value of transitoriness
is a scarcity value within Time. Limits on the opportunity for pleasure heighten
its preciousness (Freud quoted in Fingarette, Death: Philosophical Soundings,
155).
6. Among the writers who have defended a position along these lines are John
Martin Fischer, Introduction , in The Metaphysics of Death, J. M. Fischer (ed.),
1 30 [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993], 12 and McMahan, The
Ethics of Killing, 102 3.
7. The explanation of McMahan s silence on this point is probably that he believes
that the preservation of personal identity is compatible with such psychological
changes (The Ethics of Killing, 102).
8. The metaphor of lives as narratives has been developed by a number of writers
including Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (London: Duckworth, 1985), ch. 15;
J. David Velleman, Well-being and Time , in Fischer (ed.), The Metaphysics of
Death, 48 77 and Narrative Explanation , Philosophical Review 112 (2003),
1 26; John Martin Fischer, Free Will, Death and Immortality: The Role of Nar-
rative , Philosophical Papers 34 (2005), 379 403.
9. In view of the secular perspective of this book, I shall not delve into the ques-
tion of whether any religious conception of eternal life might be more appealing
than the worldly versions I have looked at. But a few remarks are in order.
The cruder conceptions of paradise that represent it as a kind of up-market
holiday resort are open to the same Williams-style objections that life in such
an environment would eventually, and maybe quite soon, become tedious. More
spiritual versions are harder to evaluate. Aquinas wrote that Final and perfect
happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the divine essence
(Summa Theologica, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.), 3 vols
[New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947], 1a.2ae.3.8; vol. 1, 601.) I have no idea
what it would be like to enjoy the beatific vision of God for all eternity. Perhaps
one should think of this as being like the most beautiful experience one has
ever had, only far, far better still. But could this (or any) exquisite enjoyment
154 DEATH
be kept up for eternity? Moreover, if existence in heaven were to be fulfilling,
would one not have to be active rather than merely passive? Relatedly, we might
ask whether there would be any opportunities for development, or a sense
that one s existence was going somewhere, in heaven. It may be suggested that
one s primary heavenly activity would be the worshipping of God. However,
it is hard to conceive this now as an attractive way of spending eternity unless
we also envisage our desires undergoing some very profound changes; which
leads to some doubt whether the second of Williams s two conditions would be
satisfied. This problem will remain if we suppose, more radically, that time is
experienced differently in heaven, or that heavenly experience might be wholly
atemporal. But at this point the philosopher runs out of resources to pursue the
question any further.
Chapter 4: Facing death
1. The last of these metaphors was used by the psychiatrist Timothy Leary during
his final illness (cited in Leming & Dickinson, Understanding Dying, 59). Lem-
ing & Dickinson also engagingly remark that we do not die in America; we
simply take a long nap (ibid.: 58).
2. Canon Henry Scott-Holland, Death is Nothing at all , from his sermon The
King of Terrors delivered in St Paul s Cathedral in 1910 while the body of
King Edward VII was lying in state in Westminster Abbey. I am grateful to the
Reverend Anthony Bash for reminding me of this poem, which, he informs me,
people often ask to be read at funerals. Fortunately, poetical attempts at death
denial are not always so bathetic as this, as John Donne s famous sonnet Death
be not Proud and George Herbert s Death amply demonstrate.
3. All too many philosophers, McMahan thinks, have indulged in the practice of
wringing a meager drop of consolation from the rags of bad argument (The
Ethics of Killing, 96).
4. For one moving account of a Stoic death, see letter 77 in Seneca, Letters from
a Stoic, selected by Robin Campbell (trans.) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969),
126 7.
5. Note that while I can only fear things that are fearful or frightening to me, I can
fear that certain things will be thus and so that I expect to be bad or painful for
others rather than myself (e.g. I fear that you will one day regret those badly
chosen words ).
6. The addition of the phrase within parentheses is to keep in mind the point made
in Chapter 2 that some people may prefer even an irretrievably painful existence
to no existence at all. (We might call this the Belial perspective , after Milton s
fallen angel: see p. 29).
7. Until the time of the Reformation, scenes of the Last Judgement ( Doom paint-
ings ) formed the standard decoration of chancel arches of parish churches
throughout the length and breadth of England. The dismaying impact that these
lurid visions must have had on ordinary people is difficult now to imagine. By
the end of the Middle Ages the predominant opinion among theologians and
religious teachers was that, in view of our natural sinfulness, only a very small
proportion of mankind would be saved. To many Christians of the period it
must have seemed that their mode of being was being-towards-hell.
8. This opinion may be controversial. Rai Gaita thinks it possible that some ani-
NOTES 155
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