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through confidential channels and made a request mine what weapons Cuba can use and what powerful armaments and anti-aircraft missiles,
not to aggravate the situation until the end of the armaments it may not possess. And then the so we consider that he [Kennedy] also made a
elections to Congress [on 6 November 1962 Americans decided to carry out a direct aggres- concession.
ed.], and not to proceed to the Berlin issue. We sion. Their plan consisted of two parts. Wishing The statement of Kennedy about non-ag-
responded that we could wait until the end of the to free themselves from the threat of a blow from gression against Cuba on the part of the USA and
elections [campaign], but immediately after them the strategic missiles, they decided to liquidate latinamerican countries also represents a conces-
we should proceed to the Berlin issue. When the the launchers in Cuba with the help of conven- sion. If we take into account these reciprocal
Americans learned about the transport of strate- tional warhead missiles and immediately after concessions and all other factors, we will see that
gic weapons to Cuba they themselves began that land troops on Cuban territory in order to a big victory has been gained. Never before have
crying a lot about Berlin. Both sides were talking liquidate centers of resistance as soon as possible. the Americans made such a statement. That is
about the Berlin crisis, but simultaneously be- It would have been impossible for us in these why we decided that the main objective salva-
lieved that at that given moment the essence of circumstances not to repulse the aggression of the tion of Cuba had been achieved. There would
their policy was located in Cuba. USA. This assault would mean an assault upon not be an assault against Cuba. There would not
By mid-September the Americans appar- you and us, as far as in Cuba there were situated be a war. We are gaining more favorable posi-
ently received data regarding the transport to Soviet troops and strategic missiles. Inevitably, tions.
Cuba of Soviet troops and strategic missiles. I nuclear war would be unleashed as a result of Indeed, it was necessary to send the draft of
have already spoken about this fact with comrade such a collision. Certainly we would destroy our decision to Cuba in order to have consulta-
Fidel Castro. The American intelligence was not America, our country would be strongly dam- tions with you, to receive your consent and only
the first in obtaining that information, it was West aged too, but we have a larger territory. Cuba then announce it. It would have been done in this
German intelligence who gave that information would have been destroyed first. Imperialists way if there were normal conditions. In his letter
to the Americans. The American administration would do their best to liquidate Cuba. Fidel Castro informed us that an inevitable ag-
sent planes to the air space of Cuba for aerial The objective of all the measures under- gression was expected in 24 hours. By the mo-
photography and the ascertainment of the de- taken by the Soviet Union was the defense of ment when we received it and were discussing the
ployment areas of the strategic missiles. N.S. Cuba. It was necessary to determine our line of situation, only 10-12 hours were left before ag-
Khrushchev gave the order to place the missiles conduct. The loss of Cuba would mean a serious gression. If we had tried to send you our draft we
into vertical position only at night, but to main- blow to the whole socialist camp. And exactly at would have had to encode the document, transmit
tain them in a lying-down position in the daytime. the moment when we were pondering the ques- it by radio, decipher it, translate it into Spanish.
98 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN
All of this could take more than 10 hours and such in case of war. True, they have certain political letter to Khrushchev, N.S. Khrushchev wrote to
a consultation would not have made sense by that significance but we don t pay them special im- Kennedy and simultaneously with my letter an
time. It would be too late. It could happen in such portance, though we will seek their liquidation. answer from Kennedy to Khrushchev arrived.
a way, that the answer would be received, but From your statements I see now that the After all, why is Kennedy already speaking about
Cuba itself would have ceased to exist, a war Cubans were regarding this demand as if it was the Soviet proposal about dismantling, etc., in his
would have been unleashed. It was a critical some sort of exchange. There are USA bases not response of 27 October to Khrushchev s message
moment. We thought our Cuban friends would only in Turkey, but also in England and other of 26 October, if it was not directly said in the
understand us. Moreover we knew from the cable European countries. But nowadays these bases confidential message from Khrushchev of 26
from Fidel Castro that the Cuban leadership was do not have decisive importance insofar as the October? Negotiations began at night, after the
aware of the direct threat of assault. At that long-range strategic missiles, aimed at Europe, message from Kennedy. Consequently, it was
moment the main objective consisted of prevent- can quickly destroy them. not possible to consider inevitable an attack against
ing an attack. We thought, the Cuban comrades us. When I was writing to N.S. Khrushchev I
would understand us. Therefore, we made the F. CASTRO. There is a question, on which didn t know that Khrushchev was writing to
decision to act immediately, but without paying we are insufficiently informed. Kennedy and Kennedy to Khrushchev. It seems
due attention to the psychological factor, about On 26 October the Soviet government sent to me that on 27 October, at that time, there was
which comrade Fidel Castro spoke here. Kennedy a letter without a word about Turkey. no unavoidable threat of attack. The principle of
Regarding the possibility of a truce at that On 27 October we learned about Turkey from the agreement had already been found. It seems to
moment, mentioned by the Cuban comrades, the broadcasts of Soviet radio. The American media me that there was available time for consulta-
Americans would not take such a step in those expressed some surprise because this problem tions.
conditions. There are a lot of revanchists in the had not been raised in the message of the 26th.
Pentagon, and Kennedy is a deterrent element What is it, a false communication or were there A.I. MIKOYAN. In his answer of 27 Octo-
with respect to them. The Americans would have two letters of 26 and 27 October? We have ber Kennedy was formally responding as if only
burst into Cuba. We had no time. Certainly, it received one letter that coincided with the docu- to the confidential message of the 26th, but prac-
was a decision that created some difficulties for ment transmitted by Moscow radio. tically he was answering both this one and chiefly
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